HAVING FAILED FOR MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS to synthesize United States social and labour history effectively or to make the often recondite findings and interpretations of the "new" history accessible to a larger reading audience, many scholars have resorted to "bringing the state back into" their narratives. Historians, especially, seem eager to write stories that have a plot and that develop sequentially and chronologically. Not for them a postmodernist sensibility that denies the validity of central truths, omnipotent authorial voices, and real historical times; not for them the cacophony of multiple voices contesting historical reality or telling competing narratives. At least that appears to be the case among younger historians whose consciousness was formed in the student protest movement and counterculture of the 1960s and who have written some of the best of the "new" social and 
Here then we are back on the once favourite terrain of an older generation of sociologists and cultural andiropologists who relished explicating social problems in terms of a cultural lag between material forces and people* s ability to understand, assimilate, accommodate, and manipulate such forces. As die historical sociologist Sigmund Diamond wrote more man twenty years ago in his introduction to a collection of historical documents: "The attempt of persons to understand die forces remaking their world and, by organization, to control diem, constitutes, indeed, die major motif of die social history of die late nineteen» century." Dawley reworks Diamond's theme in an opus that plays variations on die tune of cultural lag. He focuses particularly on die gap between a society increasingly dominated by die "visible hand" of concentrated, oligopolistic corporate enterprises and a state built on die archaic concept of laissez-faire plus a policeman's club. In Dawley's reading of history, die weak, underdeveloped, premodem American state guaranteed diat powerful private parties dominated society to die disadvantage of workers, nonwhites, and women. The absence of effective public autiiority and regulation created a herrenvolk state and society, an order diat secured die rights and privileges of wealdiy, white, Protestant men.
Dawley constructs a three-act drama (Part I: The Problem, 1890-1912; Part n; Confronting the Issues, 1913 Issues, -1924 Part m: The Resolution 1925 -1938 in which die New Deal resolves die final act by accepting "social responsibility" and providing citizens witii "security." He describes pre-New Deal federal courts and spoils-based political parties diat guaranteed limited government, male dominance dirough die doctrine of separate spheres, and white supremacy. His capitalists, having saturated die domestic market by die 1890s, turned to expansion overseas for profits, precipitating an era of US imperialism (here, as elsewhere in his synoptic treatment of US foreign policy, Dawley remains indebted to V.I. Lenin, John Hobson, and William Appleman Williams). As his dynamic society sundered die traditional ties diat bound people and groups together, sparking rebellions by new workers, new immigrants, and new women, white Protestant elitists turned to voluntary reform societies and die liberal state to create a rational, more scientific basis for social order and harmony. Here Dawley offers a Laschian cum Foucaultian interpretation of how die reform state and its experts usurped die traditional functions of die family, die ethnic society, and die church.
Progressivism dominates Act II as a protean effort to refashion die liberal state in order to establish effective public regulation over destructive private activities. Dawley follows die tale told by Martin Sklar,' as die former describes a battle between die advocates of "managerial liberalism" (more familiarly known as die private regime of corporate liberalism or welfare capitalism) and "progressive liberalism" (public state regulation) which culminated during Dawley's interpretation of the New Deal and the creation of a modem activist state in the United States is built on a series of contradictions. On the one hand, he asserts that "the tension between the corporate elite and labouring mass was the main dynamic of social change in this period" (410) and that New Deal reforms "altered forever relations between state and society." (378) On the other hand, he portrays a reality in which the New Deal built a modern system based "on atomized consumer families operating in state-regulated markets under the aegis of the modem corporation" (408) and in which "Not liberty, not equality, but security was emerging as the pivotal concept of the New Deal." (370) Dawley, in fact, reduces the single most radical piece of New Deal legislation, the Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act of 1935), into a law that benefitted workers only by inducing them to accept their continued subordination at work. In Dawley's telling of the tale. Senator Robert Wagner and his allies sought not to redistribute wealth or power but rather to rationalize the economy and promote recovery in the interest of corporate capital. Hence the Wagner Act sanctioned only responsible unions and confined collective bargaining by excluding union-management negotiations over investment, product, and labour-process decisions.
To say the least, Dawley reads the Wagner Act oddly. To be sure, Wagner and his associates were neither anti-capitalists nor did they seek to promote revolution, which prompted communists and a few other leftists to condemn the act as a harbinger of fascism. In reality, however, the act sought to save capitalism precisely by redistributing income and power through the collective organization of workers into unions left free to bargain with employers over any issue they had the strength to force to the table.
That the New Deal promoted the reconciliation of capitalism and social reform through social security not social equality is an old story. That the New Deal lacked revolutionary intentions in an even older tale. To stress only the stabilizing and conservatizing tendencies of the New Deal, as Dawley does however, is to play the part of an omniscient Victorian narrator, who know how the story ends, indeed who creates the ending, not the historian sensitive to a contingent past Put more simply, New Dealers and other Americans during the heady days of the 1930s battled on far more contested terrain than Struggles for Justice suggests.
Much of what passes for newness in Dawley's synthesis rings anachronistic. Looking at the American past from the vantage point of the last decade of the 20th century, he writes repeatedly about the persistence of racism and sexism, forces left untouched even by the New Deal, and of a "family wage" doctrine that condemned women to inferiority and exploitation. In doing so, Dawley denies the past its pastness and alters its use of language. The "family wage" is a late 20th-century invention in to explain the persistence of male-female wage and skill differentials to the post-industrial era. From the Progressive era to the New Deal, reformers commonly spoke of a "living wage," one that would be high enough to enable the primary breadwinner (ordinarily identified, to be sure, as an adult male head of household but which could also encompass female household heads) to support the remainder of the household at a minimum level of health and decency without compelling secondary wage-earners to enter the labour market It also sought to enable single wage-earners, male or female, to maintain themselves securely about the poverty level. Moreover, was it such a bad thing for reformers and advocates of the "living wage" who spanned the spectrum from genteel reformers to left-wing socialists, to seek to relieve working-class wives from die necessity of entering a labour market that exploited working people? Many of die reformers who waged battles for die "living wage" were also in die forefront of die struggle for women's rights in all aspects of state and society. So, too, with die impact of die New Deal, which by altering forever relations between state and society (Dawley's words) held die promise of transforming racial and gender relations. If die state had die power to regulate relations between employers and employees across a broad spectrum of die economy; if die state could tax corporate and private incomes not just to cover die costs of government but also to pay for ambitious reforms; if die state could use die power to tax to create a system of social security for die elderly and die otherwise dependent; why could it not use die same power to alter racial relations in die soudi and gender relations nationally? The quite real potentiality of state power to transform race and gender relations caused Southern Democrats and northern conservatives (mostly Republicans) to unite in order to contain die radicalism inherent in die New Deal's version of an activist modem state. This is a part of the tale of the emergence of the modern American state that Dawley fails to tell.
Perhaps Dawley loses sight of how much first the Progressive and then the New Deal state reshaped social relations in the United States partly because, throughout the book, he compares and contrasts Imperial, Weimar, and Nazi Germany with the United States, and partly because, at heart, he aches for a real 20th-century American revolution. One should not criticize Dawley too harshly for seeking to compare the histories of Germany and the United States. On the surface, they cry out for comparison. Both nations surpassed Great Britain as economic powers in the decade of the 1890s; both built their economies on giant enterprises in the newer metal shaping, electrical manufacturing, petrochemical, and automobile production sectors of the economy; both were aggressive latecomers to the battles for imperial hegemony; and both struggled ceaselessly to overcome the lag between inherited state structures and a dynamic society mat revolutionized social and economic relations. But if Dawley simplifies the history of the United States, with which he is familiar, what can one say about his version of modern German history? No more than that he has read (most in translation) and summarized the best in recent German historical scholarship that bolsters his interpretation of the past. Thus we find the expected contrasts between the strong Prussian state and the weak US state, the Bismarckian state welfare system and the American preference for non-state voluntary welfare agencies, the homogenous, united, and social democratic German working class and the heterogeneous, fragmented, and two-party American working class, and, finally, the Hitlerian total state, and the New Deal limited reform state. In the end, then, we have learned that Germany was not the United States, nor was the United States Germany. In words borrowed from Aristide Zolberg, we find two common histories yet also two exceptionalisms. These two books serve, each its own way, to explain why the rise and decline of the New Deal was the central political conjuncture in 20th-century United States history. For the first three quarters of a century of modern US history, the "labour question" and the distribution of wealth and income acted as the most contentious and divisive issue in national politics. For a time, at least, the New Deal resolved the "labour question" by legitimating mass-production unions, promoting economic growth, and creating a high mass-consumption society in which most working people shared. As the "labour questkw" receded froro the public arena and pluralism stripped politics of ideology, the New Deal order lost its raison d'être. AU this is fully and fairly treated in the two books. Repeatedly, Dawley and the essays in Fraser and Gerstle imply how social and economic changes'compelled a laggard state to adjust to new realities. Yet by writing such a structural history, by nearly eliminating personality and contingency from the past, they also, in effect, leave the state out rather than bring it back in. Rarely do we grasp how a modern state really performs; to what extent permanent civil servants, whose numbers rose steadily, serve their putative elective superiors, their administrative agencies, or the public interest; how public policy is formulated among the different branches of the state and then implemented by civil servants, or, as some prefer to label them, bureaucrats; indeed, most of all, how the state through its policies, practices, and officials creates new social and economic realities. Much as we may learn about politics and the state in the modern United States from reading Dawley, Fraser and Gerstle, much more remains to be done by historians in exploring the mechanics of public administration and bringing the state back into history.
